Rationale Treatment guidelines recommend a more conservative surgical approach than mastectomy for early stage breast cancer and a stronger emphasis on adjuvant therapy. Registry data at South Australian teaching hospitals have been used to monitor survivals and treatment in relation to these guidelines.Aims and objectives To use registry data to: (1) investigate trends in survival and treatment; and (2) compare treatment with guidelines.Methods Registry data from three teaching hospitals were used to analyse trends in primary courses of treatment of breast (...) cancers during 1977–2003 (n = 4671), using univariate analyses and multiple logistic regression. Disease-specific survivals were analysed using Kaplan–Meier product limit estimates and multivariable Cox proportional hazards regression.Results The 5-year survival was 79.9%, but with a secular increase, reaching 83.6% in 1997–2003. The relative risk of death (95% confidence limits) was 0.74 (0.62, 0.88) for 1997–2003, compared with previous diagnoses, after adjusting for tumour node metastasis stage, grade, age and place of residence. Treatment changes included an increase in conservative surgery (as opposed to mastectomy) from 51.7% in 1977–1990 to 76.8% in 1997–2003 for stage I (P < 0.001) and from 31.1% to 52.2% across these periods for stage II (P < 0.001). Adjuvant radiotherapy also became more common (P < 0.001), with 20.6% of patients receiving this treatment in 1977–1990 compared with 60.7% in 1997–2003. Radiotherapy generally was more prevalent when conservative surgery was provided, although also relatively common in mastectomy patients when tumour diameters exceeded 50 mm or when there were four or more involved nodes. The proportion of patients receiving chemotherapy increased (P < 0.001), from 19.6% in 1977–1990 to 36.9% in 1997–2003, and the proportion having hormone therapy also increased (P < 0.001), from 34.3% to 59.4% between these periods.Conclusions Survivals appear to be increasing and treatment trends are broadly consistent with guideline directions, and the earlier research on which these recommendations were based. (shrink)

Although'Otherness' is an extremely common phenomenon in every society, related research is still at its beginnings.'Otherness' in the Middle Ages is a versatile and complex theme that covers a great number of different aspects, facets, and approaches: from non-human monsters and cultural strangers from remote places up to foreigners from another country or another town; it can refer to ethnic, cultural, political, social, sexual, or religious'Otherness', inside or outside one's own community. In any case, however,'Otherness' is a subjective phenomenon depending (...) on personal views and ascriptions, an issue of'imagination' and experience rather than'reality'. There is neither one single model of alterity nor is'Otherness' a stable phenomenon, but it changes over time and according to the cultural context. All this calls for methodological reflection and needs thorough investigation.00The methodological introduction and the 18 contributions of this volume demonstrate the great diversity of the theme and its different manifestations and perspectives. They tackle the problem from distinct angles and disciplines (history, art history, archaeology, literary history, and philology) in a wide chronological and thematic frame, using different methodological approaches, dealing with different areas (from Northern and Southern Europe to Byzantium and India), perspectives (including law, social order, the past, a sea), and diverse kinds of sources. They examine all kinds of'Otherness' mentioned above, highlight demarcation and rejection, aversion or acceptance, assimilation and integration, thus relativizing a strict dichotomy between'the Self' and'the Other' or between inside and outside. This volume is so far the most comprehensive attempt to tackle the huge problem of'Otherness' in the Middle Ages. (shrink)

Machine learning algorithms may radically improve our ability to diagnose and treat disease. For moral, legal, and scientific reasons, it is essential that doctors and patients be able to understand and explain the predictions of these models. Scalable, customisable, and ethical solutions can be achieved by working together with relevant stakeholders, including patients, data scientists, and policy makers.

The link between alcohol consumption and cancer is well established, but public awareness of the risk remains low. Mandated warning labels have been suggested as a way of ensuring “informed choice” about alcohol consumption. In this article we explore various ethical issues that may arise in connection with cancer warning labels on alcoholic beverages; in particular we highlight the potentially questionable autonomy of alcohol consumption decisions and consider the implications if the autonomy of drinking behavior is substantially compromised. Our discussion (...) demonstrates the need for the various ethical issues to be considered and addressed in any decision to mandate cancer warning labels. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In keeping with the pre‐eminent status accorded autonomy within Australia, Europe, and the United States, medical practice requires that patients authorize do‐not‐resuscitate (DNR) orders, intended to countermand the default practice in hospitals of instituting cardiopulmonary‐resuscitation (CPR) on all patients experiencing cardio‐pulmonary arrest. As patients typically do not make these decisions proactively, however, family members are often asked to act as surrogate decision‐makers and decide on the patient's behalf. Although the appropriateness of patients or their families having to decide about (...) the provision of CPR has been challenged, there has been little examination of how patients and their families talk about and negotiate such decisions, particularly in the context of the patient's imminent death. In this article, part of a larger study analysing interviews with 28 patients (13 female) with cancer within weeks of their death, and 20 others (predominantly family) attending, we argue that a common assumption underpinning participants' talk about the DNR decision (i.e. forgoing CPR) is that it requires a choice between life and death. Using illustrative examples, we demonstrate that in making decisions about CPR, patients and their families are implicitly required to make moral judgements about the value of the patient's life, including their relationships with significant others. We identify some implications of these empirical observations for the development of ethically appropriate policies and practices regarding patient autonomy and surrogacy at the end of life. (shrink)

How people react emotionally to the positive or negative events that they experience in their lives depends in part on whether particular outcomes are perceived to be deserved or undeserved. For ex...

Bayesians take “definite” or “single-case” probabilities to be basic. Definite probabilities attach to closed formulas or propositions. We write them here using small caps: PROB(P) and PROB(P/Q). Most objective probability theories begin instead with “indefinite” or “general” probabilities (sometimes called “statistical probabilities”). Indefinite probabilities attach to open formulas or propositions. We write indefinite probabilities using lower case “prob” and free variables: prob(Bx/Ax). The indefinite probability of an A being a B is not about any particular A, but rather about the (...) property of being an A. In this respect, its logical form is the same as that of relative frequencies. For instance, we might talk about the probability of a human baby being female. That probability is about human babies in general — not about individuals. If we examine a baby and determine conclusively that she is female, then the definite probability of her being female is 1, but that does not alter the indefinite probability of human babies in general being female. Most objective approaches to probability tie probabilities to relative frequencies in some way, and the resulting probabilities have the same logical form as the relative frequencies. That is, they are indefinite probabilities. The simplest theories identify indefinite probabilities with relative frequencies.3 It is often objected that such “finite frequency theories” are inadequate because our probability judgments often diverge from relative frequencies. For example, we can talk about a coin being fair (and so the indefinite probability of a flip landing heads is 0.5) even when it is flipped only once and then destroyed (in which case the relative frequency is either 1 or 0). For understanding such indefinite probabilities, it has been suggested that we need a notion of probability that talks about possible instances of properties as well as actual instances.. (shrink)

Cross-cultural sex differences in mobility and harm avoidance have been widely reported, often emphasizing fitness benefits of long-distance travel for males and high costs for females. Data emerging from adults in small-scale societies, however, are challenging the assumption that female mobility is restricted during reproduction. Such findings warrant further exploration of the ontogeny of mobility. Here, using a combination of machine-learning, mixed-effects linear regression, and GIS mapping, we analyze range size, daily distance traveled, and harm avoidance among Hadza foragers during (...) middle childhood and adolescence. Distance traveled increased with age and, while male adolescents had the longest daily ranges, average daily distance traveled by each sex was similar. We found few age- or sex-related patterns in harm-avoidant responses and a high degree of individual variation. When queried on the same issues, children and their parents were often in alignment as to expectations pertaining to harm avoidance, and siblings tended to behave in similar ways. To the extent that sex differences in mobility did emerge, they were associated with ecological differences in physical threats associated with sex-specific foraging behaviors. Further, we found no strong association between harm avoidance and mobility. Young Hadza foragers of both sexes are highly mobile, regardless of how harm avoidant they are. Taken together, our findings indicate that the causal arrows between harm avoidance and mobility must be evaluated in ecologically specific frameworks where cultural expectations of juvenile mobility can be contextualized. (shrink)

Social, political, and economic environments play an active role in nurturing professional virtue. Yet, these environments can also lead to the erosion of virtue. As such, professional virtue is fragile and vulnerable to environmental shifts. While physicians are often considered to be among the most virtuous of professional groups, concern has also always existed about the impact of commercial arrangements on physicians’ willingness and capacity to enact their professional virtues. This article examines the ways in which commercial arrangements have been (...) negotiated to secure medical virtue from real or perceived threats of erosion. In particular, we focus on the concern surrounding conflicts of interest arising from commercial arrangements that have developed as a result of neoliberal economic and social policies. The deregulation of medical markets and privatization of services have produced new commercial relationships that are often misunderstood by patients, publics, and physicians themselves. ‘Conflicts of interest’ policies have been introduced in an attempt to safeguard ethical conduct and medical practice. However, a number of virtue ethicists have critiqued these policies as inadequate for securing virtue. We examine the ways in which commercial arrangements have been seen to impact upon medical virtue, both historically and in the context of modern medicine. We then describe and critique current efforts to restore clinical virtue through both conflict of interest policies and through virtue ethics. Finally, we suggest some possible ways of addressing the corrosive effects of neoliberalism on medical virtue. (shrink)

A correction to this paper has been published: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12110-021-09403-x.

Finlay et al. describe a method of examining brain evolution, but it has limits that may hinder extrapolation to all vertebrate taxa or the understanding of how brains work. For example, members of different orders have brain and behavioral organization that are fundamentally different. Future investigations should incorporate a phylogenetic approach and more attention to behavior to further test their conclusions.

Over the past decade, umbilical cord blood (UCB) has routinely been used as a source of haematopoietic stem cells for allogeneic stem cell transplants in the treatment of a range of malignant and non-malignant conditions affecting children and adults. UCB banks are a necessary part of the UCB transplant program, but their establishment has raised a number of important scientific, ethical and political issues. This paper examines the scientific and clinical evidence that has provided the basis for the establishment of (...) UCB banks. We also discuss the major ethical issues that UCB banks raise, including ownership of cord blood, processes for obtaining consent for its collection and storage, and confidentiality. Finally, we review other concerns about commercial non-altruistic banking, including concerns about social justice, equity of access and equity of care. (shrink)

BackgroundIn the Canadian Alliance for Healthy Hearts and Minds (CAHHM) cohort, participants underwent magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) of the brain, heart, and abdomen, that generated incidental findings (IFs). The approach to managing these unexpected results remain a complex issue. Our objectives were to describe the CAHHM policy for the management of IFs, to understand the impact of disclosing IFs to healthy research participants, and to reflect on the ethical obligations of researchers in future MRI studies.MethodsBetween 2013 and 2019, 8252 participants (...) (mean age 58 ± 9 years, 54% women) were recruited with a follow-up questionnaire administered to 909 participants (40% response rate) at 1-year. The CAHHM policy followed a restricted approach, whereby routine feedback on IFs was not provided. Only IFs of severe structural abnormalities were reported.ResultsSevere structural abnormalities occurred in 8.3% (95% confidence interval 7.7–8.9%) of participants, with the highest proportions found in the brain (4.2%) and abdomen (3.1%). The majority of participants (97%) informed of an IF reported no change in quality of life, with 3% of participants reporting that the knowledge of an IF negatively impacted their quality of life. Furthermore, 50% reported increased stress in learning about an IF, and in 95%, the discovery of an IF did not adversely impact his/her life insurance policy. Most participants (90%) would enrol in the study again and perceived the MRI scan to be beneficial, regardless of whether they were informed of IFs. While the implications of a restricted approach to IF management was perceived to be mostly positive, a degree of diagnostic misconception was present amongst participants, indicating the importance of a more thorough consent process to support participant autonomy.ConclusionThe management of IFs from research MRI scans remain a challenging issue, as participants may experience stress and a reduced quality of life when IFs are disclosed. The restricted approach to IF management in CAHHM demonstrated a fair fulfillment of the overarching ethical principles of respect for autonomy, concern for wellbeing, and justice. The approach outlined in the CAHHM policy may serve as a framework for future research studies.Clinical trial registrationhttps://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/show/nct02220582. (shrink)

We study relation algebras with n-dimensional relational bases in the sense of Maddux. Fix n with 3nω. Write Bn for the class of non-associative algebras with an n-dimensional relational basis, and RAn for the variety generated by Bn. We define a notion of relativised representation for algebras in RAn, and use it to give an explicit equational axiomatisation of RAn, and to reprove Maddux's result that RAn is canonical. We show that the algebras in Bn are precisely those that have (...) a complete relativised representation of this type. Then we prove that whenever 4nshrink)

The dissertation's primary task is to discern to what extent the investigations contained in Aristotle's Metaphysics conform to the model of science developed in the Posterior Analytics. It concludes that the Metaphysics substantially follows the model of the Analytics in studying the causes and attributes of a specific nature, although it makes significant departures especially in its conception of the principles of being and substance. ;Two introductory chapters discuss respectively Aristotle's conception of science in the Analytics and the problems one (...) is likely to face in attempting to apply this conception to the Metaphysics . Chapter 3 clarifies the meaning of the phrase "science of being qua being" by reference to the Posterior Analytics, and introduces the concept of pro&d13;v 3&d3;n equivocity. Chapter 4 considers the role of dialectic in metaphysics with particular reference to the principle of noncontradiction. Chapter 5 argues that the second part of Meta. 4.2 introduces a demonstrative science of the per se attributes of being and unity. ;Chapter 6 introduces the investigation into the principles and causes of being and reviews the aporias about the principles . Chapter 7 offers a hypothesis to explain Aristotle's identification of the science of being with first philosophy. The last two chapters argue that Aristotle is pursuing this investigation in the central books of Melaphysics, but his pursuit of the investigation there is incomplete. ;This interpretation provides an alternative to those of T. H. Irwin and Walter Leszl, who argue that metaphysics is a second-order discipline and not a science after the model of the Analytics. It finds explicit support in recent work by Robert Bolton and Alan Code, while widening the range of issues to include the attributes of being and the importance of first philosophy for understanding the nature of being. It supports many of the conclusions of Joseph Owens's, Urbain Dhondt's, and Frede and Patzig's work on the object of metaphysics. There are also substantial discussions of the contributions of G. E. L. Owen, J. G. Stevenson, Theodore Scaltsas, and John Thorp. (shrink)

Timothy Williamson has recently put forward a proof that every object exists necessarily. I show where the proof fails. My diagnosis also exposes the fallacy in A. N. Prior's argument in favour of his modal logic, Q.

Evidence from many different paradigms (e.g. change blindness, inattentional blindness, transsaccadic integration) indicate that observers are often very poor at reporting changes to their visual environment. Such evidence has been used to suggest that the spatio-temporal coherence needed to represent change can only occur in the presence of focused attention. In four experiments we use modified change blindness tasks to demonstrate (a) that sensitivity to change does occur in the absence of awareness, and (b) this sensitivity does not rely on (...) the redeploy- ment of attention. We discuss these results in relation to theories of scene percep- tion, and propose a reinterpretatio n of the role of attention in representing change. (shrink)

L'objet de cet article est de reconsidérer la nature du Contrat chez Thomas Hobbes, tel qu'il la définit plus particulièrement au chapitre XIV du Leviathan, et de la replacer dans une perspective légale, historique, et jurisprudentielle précise. La notion de contrat au milieu du dix-septième siècle en Angleterre etait très différente de celle que nous reconnaissons aujourd'hui en matière de jurisprudence dans le domaine de la 'Common Law'. Hobbes décrit un contrat strictement socratique et strictement formaliste dans lequel l'équité qui (...) fait la substance du contrat en est une qualité immanente. La théorie du contrat que Hobbes applique à la constitution est done avant tout socratique et formaliste, et en aucun cas positiviste. La promesse en elle-même n'a pas force de contrainte, elle n'est que l'indication de l'existence potentielle d'un contrat. Seule la rationalité immanente de sa forme et de sa substance donne force de contrainte au contrat. Dans le contexte historique immediat de 1651, annee de parution du Leviathan, Hobbes, en définissant le contrat en ces termes, soulageait la conscience de nombreux Anglais à qui répugnait l'acte d'allégeance au Commonwealth . II leur assurait qu'un tel acte d'allégeance ne constituait pas en soi un contrat, mais une simple promesse indicative, qui ne les contraignait ni en forme ni en substance. L'acte d'alléeance au Commonwealth, en termes de contrat, était sans portée juridique. (shrink)

Cette lettre, publiée ici pour la première fois en français, dans sa version originale, a été envoyée par Jean Wahl à Martin Heidegger le 12 décembre 1937. Elle répond à une lettre que Heidegger avait écrite à Wahl une semaine plus tôt au sujet des thèses de Wahl dans la célèbre conférence « Subjectivité et transcendance ». [1] Dans cette conférence, qui a été décrite comme « un tournant dans l’histoire intellectuelle du XXe siècle », [2] Wahl s’interrogeait, entre autres, (...) sur la mesure dans laquelle la philosophie pouvait fournir une théorie générale des intuitions d’existences particulières telles que Kierkegaard ou Nietzsche. En d’autres termes, une philosophie de l’existence était-elle possible, ou ces existences elles-mêmes n’étaient-elles pas « à la fois plus ‘existentielles’ et plus vraiment philosophiques que les philosophies de l’existence »? [3] Dans sa réponse, Heidegger déclarait que sa propre pensée ne pouvait être qualifiée de philosophie de l’existence, car elle ne s’occupait de l’être humain que dans la mesure où celui-ci pouvait éclairer l’être lui-même. Wahl, cependant, n’était pas convaincu, et dans la lettre publiée ici, il défend à la fois sa décision d’appeler Heidegger un philosophe de l’existence et propose plusieurs objections à la manière dont Heidegger essaie de répondre à la question de l’être. (shrink)

For any finite n 3 there are two atomic n-dimensional cylindric algebras with the same atom structure, with one representable, the other, not.Hence, the complex algebra of the atom structure of a representable atomic cylindric algebra is not always representable, so that the class RCAn of representable n-dimensional cylindric algebras is not closed under completions. Further, it follows by an argument of Venema that RCAn is not axiomatisable by Sahlqvist equations, and hence nor by equations where negation can only occur (...) in constant terms.Similar results hold for relation algebras. (shrink)

Michel Foucault’s suggestion that this century would become known as “Deleuzian” was considered by Gilles Deleuze himself to be a joke “meant to make people who like us laugh, and make everyone else livid.” Whether serious or not, Foucault’s prediction has had enough of an impact to raise concern about the potential “deification” of this enormously influential French philosopher. Seeking to counter such tendencies toward hagiography—not unknown, particularly since Deleuze’s death—Ian Buchanan has assembled a collection of essays that constitute a (...) critical and focused engagement with Deleuze and his work. Originally published as a special issue of _South Atlantic Quarterly_, this volume includes essays from some of the most prominent American, Australian, British, and French scholars and translators of Deleuze’s writing. These essays, ranging from film, television, art, and literature to philosophy, psychoanalysis, geology, and cultural studies, reflect the broad interests of Deleuze himself. Providing both an introduction and critique of Deleuze, this volume will engage those readers interested in literary and cultural theory, philosophy, and the future of those areas of study in which Deleuze worked. _Contributors_. Ronald Bogue, Ian Buchanan, André Pierre Colombat, Tom Conley, Manuel DeLanda, Tessa Dwyer, Jerry Aline Flieger, Eugene Holland, Fredric Jameson, Jean-Clet Martin, John Mullarkey, D. N. Rodowick, Horst Ruthrof, Charles J. Stivale. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of MoralsIan RossDavid Hume. An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. Tom L. Beauchamp, editor. The Clarendon Edition of the Works of David Hume. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998.An edition of Hume's philosophic writings on rigorous, modern bibliographic principles has long been a scholarly desideratum. Readers in the many fields in which Hume's thought and style have made a profound impression have (...) basically relied on the originals or derivatives of efforts of the Victorian era. One is Hume's Philosophical Works (4 v., London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1874-75), edited by the Oxford dons, T. H. Green and T. H. Grose. Well-known for his idealist philosophy and theory of liberalism, Green contributed introductions to the first and second volumes criticizing Hume from an anti-empirical standpoint. Grose offered a "History of [Hume's] Editions" as an introduction to the third volume, and claimed to have revised Hume's text throughout. This edition has the virtue of comprehensiveness, but is deficient in its offering of variant readings. Later there came from Oxford University Press editions of the Treatise of Human Nature (1888), deemed generally sound, and the two Enquiries (1894), marred by departures from Hume's text, prepared by a prominent civil servant, Sir Lawrence Amherst Selby-Bigge, whose chief contribution was to provide useful analytical indices. An attempt at achieving higher editorial standards was made by P. H. Nidditch, Professor of Philosophy in the University of Sheffield, in a "second" edition of Selby-Bigge's Treatise (1976) and a "third" edition of his text of the Enquiries (1975). Limits were imposed by Oxford University Press, apparently unwilling to make more then small changes in the existing pages. Nidditch announced (Enquiries, 1975, at p.348, n.2) that he had a "fresh" edition in preparation, but he did not live to complete this project.In the event, the challenge to produce a critical edition of Hume's philosophical, political, and literary writings was canvassed at early meetings of the Hume Society formed in 1973. Thereafter, in 1982, a team of general editors was formed by T. L. Beauchamp, D. F. Norton, and M. A. Stewart, determined to organize and finish the task in hand, and Oxford University Press finally conceded it was time to replace Selby-Bigge. With the appearance of Tom Beauchamp's "critical edition" of the second Enquiry (hereafter identified as EPM), published on 4 August 1999, but bearing the date 1998, the long wait for a reliable text, bibliographic apparatus, and ancillary scholarship, worthy of Hume, must be declared over.If we grant that it is appropriate to introduce the new Clarendon Edition of the Works of David Hume with the piece he deemed "best," it must also be asked why he made this judgment. Philosophers have generally held that his Treatise of Human Nature (1739-40) is the most profound and searching statement of his epistemological and moral thought, but its seeming lack of immediate success with readers made Hume dissatisfied with it. Such were his negative feelings, coupled with irritation at attacks on him focused on this "juvenile" work, that he partially repudiated the Treatise at the end of his life. He wrote an "Advertisement" to this effect, and it was inserted as a preface to the authoritative and posthumous 1777 edition of his Essays and Treatises. Here he stated he was "sensible of the error of going to the press too early, and he cast the whole [of [End Page 280] the Treatise] anew in the following pieces [including EPM], where some negligences in his former reasoning and more in the expression, are, he hopes, corrected" (EPM Intro., xii-xiii, n.4).On the evidence of Beauchamp's editorial labors, it would appear that EPM is Hume's "best" work in this sense. It represents the most thorough recasting of source material provided by the Treatise. Its essential moral principles and psychological insights about the passions are retained, but "readability and elegance" are achieved by pruning, simplifying, and compacting the Treatise's complex teaching, while adding a wealth of illustrative material drawn from Hume's mature reflection on his subject and... (shrink)

The conclusion urged in Mr Salmon's recent article is so remarkable that it may be worth recording some difficulties. He claims to rescue Reichenbach's notorious vindication of induction. This is essentially concerned with estimating long-run frequencies. By an estimator let us mean any rule for making estimates appropriate to various bodies of information. Reichenbach thought an estimator is sensible only if it is convergent, that is, roughly speaking, only if its estimates tend to approach the truth as more and more (...) data is collected. Mr Salmon observes that an estimator should, in addition, be independent of the language in which the information is expressed. He contends that this criterion of linguistic invariance, when added to the rest of Reichenbach's train of thought, suffices to justify the “straight rule” for estimation: if m of the n observed A's are B, estimate the long-run frequency of B among A's as m/n. (shrink)

This analysis of Herbert Marcuse’s appropriation of the argument concerning the “mathematization of nature” in Edmund Husserl’s Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology shows that Marcuse and Husserl both assume that the perception of real, concrete individuals in the lifeworld underlies formal scientific abstractions and that the critique of the latter requires a return to such qualitative perception. In contrast, I argue that no such return is possible and that real, concrete individuals are constituted by the relation between (...) a given perception and its horizon. In this manner, Marcuse’s social critique can be combined with Husserl’s theoretical-perceptual one, making possible an ecological critique. L’analyse de l’appropriation que fait Herbert Marcuse de l’argument concernant la « mathématisation de la nature » dans la Crise des sciences europe ennes et la phénoménologie transcendantale de Husserl démontre que Marcuse et Husserl assument tous les deux que la perception des individus réels concrets dans le monde de la vie sous-tend les abstractions scientifiques formelles et que la critique de ces dernières nécessite un retour à la perception qualificative. J’avance au contraire qu’un tel retour n’est pas possible et que les individus réels concrets sont constitués par la relation entre une perception donnée et son horizon. Nous pouvons alors combiner la critique sociale de Marcuse avec la critique théorico-perceptuelle de Husserl pour en faire une critique égologique. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Studies in Plato's Two-Level ModelIan MuellerHolger Thesleff. Studies in Plato's Two-Level Model. Helsinki: Societas Scientarum Fennica, 1999. Pp. vi + 143. N. P.After some 30 years of incisive intervention in Platonic scholarship, Holger Thesleff here offers us "an attempt to elaborate and ground more firmly some basic theses which I have propounded in various contexts before," (1) a rather modest description of what he also describes as an (...) attempt to contribute toward "a more general agreement on how to read and interpret Plato" (5). The richness of this book makes it impossible to describe in any detail, and I shall content myself with indicating some of what I take to be its principal points of view.Thesleff"s concern for agreement arises from his perception of the vastly discrepant schools of Plato interpretation, of which the most important for him might be labeled esotericist, analytic, and "literary." The last, which can hardly be called a school at all, includes a variety of scholars who downplay "literal" interpretation and emphasize such things as "dramatic artistry, the structure of the dialogues, the characterization of settings and persons, shifts of style, allusions, play, and irony" (3). Thesleff's sympathies clearly lie with these people, perhaps to an extent which, as I shall suggest, will limit the effectiveness of his attempt to move toward a consensus.As the title indicates Thesleff builds his reading around what he calls Plato's two-level model. This two-level model is not, as one might suppose, what has been called Plato's two worlds view, the belief in a world of pure being beyond the perceived world we inhabit. Indeed, it is not a doctrine or set of doctrines at all. Rather "it is an intuitive 'vision' which offers only crude basic patterns and frames for the structures of Plato's thinking, feelings, intuitions, and intentions, from his youth to his old age, and for our understanding of them" (123). Clearly one cannot expect a full and precise articulation of this vision. Thesleff proceeds by discussing in terms of their role in the earlier dialogues ten hierarchic pairs which form part of Plato's vision: divine/human, soul/body, leading/being led (particularly important in the conduct of a Socratic discussion), truth/appearance, knowledge/opinion, intellect/senses, defined/undefined, stability/change, one/many, same/different. These hierarchic or asymmetric pairs are contrasted by Thesleff with what he calls polar opposites like large/small and light/dark. He also stresses that the hierarchic pairs of Plato's two-level model involve no separation (chorismos), but rather a communion (koinônia).As the words "from his youth to his old age" in the quotation of the previous paragraph indicate, Thesleff is a "unitarian" in his approach to Plato. His Plato is not a philosopher whose positions changed through time as a result of reasoned argument. What many scholars take to be doctrines later given up, e.g., the view that learning is being reminded (anamnêsis), are "thought experiments," which are not followed up, thought experiments made within the context of the unchanging two-level vision.Although Thesleff is a unitarian in the sense I have indicated, he does believe that a kind of order of composition can be constructed for the dialogues. I say "kind of" because Thesleff's chronology involves assumptions of revisions over time, multiple authorship, and even dialogues "written down" by people other than Plato. The resulting chronology is complex, and I here only indicate it in rough form in a way which [End Page 272] brings out what I take to be its major points. Leaving out of account those Socratic" dialogues which Thesleff takes to be latish and the posthumously completed Laws, we can say that a series of late dialogues starts with the Parmenides and includes the Timaeus, Critias, Sophist, Politicus, and Philebus. All other dialogues, including the Theaetetus, were written prior to the Parmenides with the exception of the Republic, which Thesleff proposes is in its ultimate shape a late work, representing "only and purely Plato's 'own' and personal philosophy" (115). As for the other late dialogues, which have played an important... (shrink)

In the present study we elucidate the emotional and executive control interactions that might underlie optimism and pessimism. Participants completed a self-report measure of optimism/pessimism and performed an emotion faces categorisation task and an emotion n-back task in which they indicated whether each of a series of faces had the same or a different emotional expression (happy, sad, neutral) as the face presented two trials before. Trials were structured to measure latency to update emotional content in working memory (WM). More (...) pessimistic individuals formed connections among positive stimuli, and broke connections among positive and sad stimuli, in WM more slowly than did less pessimistic individuals; levels of optimism/pessimism did not affect the rate with which individuals formed and broke connections among neutral representations in WM. It appears, therefore, that levels of pessimism are related to specific affective cognitive mechanisms in WM that may be involved in emotion regulation. (shrink)

Teaching through discussion is perhaps the most fundamental pedagogical technique of philosophy. When done well, discussion can promote long-term, durable learning. It supports an active-learning classroom, sparks higher-order cognition, and helps students construct their own understanding of the material. Yet it is often not done well: it is easily dominated by a few students; it can waste time on tangents and minutiae; it can fail to motivate students to prepare adequately; and it is not easily scalable. In this paper we (...) present a technique, the random discussion leader (RDL), which addresses all of these shortcomings of traditional discussion. Qualitative and quantitative evidence from our quasi-experimental study (n = 279) suggests that RDL leads to better preparation, better engagement with the material, more equitable participation, and higher quality discussions. Additionally, we provide a toolkit for instructors interested in trying RDL, showing how the technique can be adapted to various course settings and materials. (shrink)

Kripke's lectures, published as Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language , posed a sceptical problem about following a rule, which he cautiously attributed to Wittgenstein. He briefly noticed an analogy between his new kind of scepticism and Goodman's riddle of induction. ‘Grue’, he said, could be used to formulate a question not about induction but about meaning: the problem would not be Goodman's about induction—‘Why not predict that grass, which has been grue in the past, will be grue in the (...) future?’—but Wittgenstein's about meaning: ‘Who is to say that in the past I did not mean grue by “green”, so that now I should call the sky, not the grass, “green”?’. (shrink)